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Housing-The Northern Civil Rights
Frontier
Joseph B. Robison
(Focusing upon state and municipal legislation designed to
combat housing discrimination, the author describes the strong
points and shortcomings of present day housing codes. His
treatment of the topic begins with a discussion of the factors
that have created the problem, progresses to an examination of
housing discrimination from a constitutional viewpoint, and
concludes with the opinion that fair housing legislation pro-
vides the opportunity to change the pattern of segregation. The
author warns that the success of this legislation depends upon
a drive by minority groups to test its effective enforcement.
-Ed.)
INTRODUCTION
Housing has become the chief civil rights issue throughout the nation
outside the South' - socially, politically, and legally. A number of fac-
tors have combined to bring this about.
First, there has been a steady increase in the extent -and severity of
housing discrimination against
minorities generally, but par-
Tim AuTHoR, a member of the United States ticularly against Negroes.2 This
Supreme Court and New York bars, is Assistant had already been a problem of
Director, Commission on Law and Social
Action, American Jewish Congress and Chair- concern prior to the end of
man of the Legal Committee of the National World War II. Since 1950,
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. census and other data have es-
tablished beyond question that
non-white housing is worse
than white housing on every count 4  With the whole housing market
dominated by patterns of discrimination, non-whites have been confined
1. In the South, of course, offically enforced discrimination and segregation are still the
major problems. Until the state-imposed patterns of exclusion from the ballot and govern-
ment service and segregation in schools and other institutions are ended, attention will be
diverted from the lesser problems that loom so large in the North. Indeed, segregation in
housing is more common in the North than in the South. In 1944, Myrdal pointed out that
"Residential segregation . .. is relatively more important in the North than in the South,
since laws and etiquette to isolate whites from Negroes are prevalent in the South but practi-
cally absent from the North, and therefore institutional segregation in the North often has
only residential segregation to rest upon." MYRDAL, AN AMmEcAN Dnimmu 618 (1944).
Moreover, in the South, a large part of the Negro population lives in unsegregated rural
areas. Others live in the older dties like Charleston and Savannah where mixed housing dates
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to the areas most in need of clearance and rehabilitation.' One of the
most important studies of the subject made in recent years concluded that,
"Segregation barriers in most cities were tighter in 1950 than ten years
earlier," and that we are now seeing "an increasing separation of racial
groups as non-whites accumulate in the central city areas abandoned by
whites and the latter continually move to new suburban subdivisions
from which minorities are barred."'  One finds all over the country the
pattern of the central city with ever increasing ghettoes surrounded by a
ring of completely segregated suburbs.7
back to the days of slavery. Id. at 621; WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 8-9 (1948). How-
ever, it has been found that "Southern cities as they develop and grow are following the pat-
tern of a central concentration of non-whites, ringed by outlying white areas." U.S. COMMIN
ON CIV. RIGHTS REP. 305 (1959).
(Note: After submission of this article, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission submitted its
1961 Report, Book 4 of which is entirely devoted to housing. It contains valuable additional
material relevant to a number of the points made in the following paragraphs.)
2. Virtually every study of the subject reveals that the chief victim of discrimination in hous-
ing is the Negro. Nevertheless, there is also substantial evidence of discrimination in some
parts of the country against Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, Orientals, Indians, and Jews.
MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 68-71 (1960); U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS REP. 366,
380-81, 545, 548 (1959); COMMISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL
WE LIvE? 1-2 (1958). Discrimination against Jews has steadily declined but survives in
scattered areas. As summarized by the American Jewish Congress: "It is still a melancholy
fact that any Jewish family seeking a home must wonder, each time they inquire about a house
or apartment, whether this is the time they will receive the cold response that betrays concealed
bias." Statement of Stanley H. Lowell on behalf of the American Jewish Congress, U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights, Hearings on Housing 369-70 (1959).
3. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 348-53, 618-27 (1944); PREsDENT'S COMM. ON
Civ. RIGHTS REPORT, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 67-70 (1947). The evidence up to 1948
is summarized in Groner & Helfeld, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426, 426-
433 (1948).
4. MCENTIRE, RESImENcE AND RACE 36-39, 148-56 (1960); U.S. CoMM'N ON CIv.
RIGHTS REP. 343-54 (1959).
5. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 354-64, 374-80, 534-5 (1959); COMMISSION ON
RACE AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 1-5, 26-28 (1958).
6. COMMISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIvE? 3 (1958).
The Commission stressed that the housing industry has changed in the last twenty years and is
now dominated by the builder of large developments so that "many new communities have
come into existence into which no single Negro has been admitted, by policy of the private
builders .... " Id. at 26. "The expanded power of private builders and the use of their power
in the manner described go far to explain the paradox of increasing residential segregation
during a period of generally weakening racial prejudice and discrimination." Id. at 27.
7. Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, Scientific American, October 1957, pp. 33-41.
The United States Census Bureau has released data on the white and non-white popula-
tion of twenty-five standard metropolitan areas, which gives the racial breakdown separately
for the central city and the area outside the central city. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Release,
March 26, 1961. It shows a uniform pattern of higher concentration of non-whites in the city
than in the surrounding area. For example, non-whites were 14.0 per cent of the population
of New York City and 4.8 per cent in the surrounding area. The figures for Chicago were
22.9 and 2.9; for Cleveland, 28.6 and 0.7.
Commenting on these figures, the Director of the Census Bureau, Richard M. Scammon,
has pointed out that they refute the widely held belief that the "flight to the suburbs" is a
flight from inmigrating Negroes. The shift revealed by the census occurs even in cities like
Minneapolis where the proportion of non-whites is only 2.4 per cent. Washington Post,
March 26, 1961 p. E3, col. 5. Thus, it is plain that the flight is due to fundamental factors
in our cities having nothing to do with race. The racial problem arises from the fact that,
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Second, faced with these obstacles, minority groups have begun to
realize the ramifying effect of segregation in housing - its strong ten-
dency to produce segregation in education, playgrounds, and all other as-
pects of our daily lives.' It is primarily responsible for the widespread
segregation in Northern urban public schools.' It has even impaired the
job opportunities opened up by fair employment laws."0
Third, pressure from within the minority group community for bet-
ter housing has increased with the generally improved economic condi-
tion of non-white families. At the same time there has been an increased
demand for housing of any kind for the large number of Negro families
moving out of the South."
Fourth, minority pressure for broader housing opportunity has re-
vealed the strength of the forces that resist change in ghetto patterns. It
seems dear that the prejudice-born distaste of associating with minority
groups reaches a high peak of intensity in the case of housing. 2 In ad-
dition, the economic structure of the housing industry is such that the
person who nominally controls sales and rentals is not normally free to
abandon the pattern of discrimination. An employer, hotel owner, or
school director who is persuaded to extend equal treatment to all appli-
cants can usually put his decision into effect without too much interfer-
ence from others. The land-owner must reckon not only with neighbors
and tenants,' but also with financial institutions that take an active part
with the strong attraction of the suburbs operating on all city residents, only majority group
families can take advantage of the homes that are being constructed. The United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights, referring to "the white noose around the city," has said: "There may
be relatively few Negroes able to afford a home in the suburbs, and only some of these would
want such homes, but the fact is that this alternative is generally closed to them. It is this
shutting of the door of opportunity open to other Americans, this confinement behind invis-
ible lines, that makes Negroes call their residential areas a ghetto." U.S. COMM'N ON CIrv.
RIGHTS REP. 378 (1959).
8. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 618 (1944); COMMIsSION ON RACE AND HOUSING
REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 35-36 (1958).
9. U.S. COMM'N ON CIv. RIGHTS REP. 389-90 (1959); Maslow, De Facto Public School
Segregation, 6 VILL. L REV. 353, 354-55 (1961).
10. N.Y. STATE COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, IN SEARCH OF HOUSING, A STUDY
OF ExPBRIENCEs OF NEGRO PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN Nnw YoRK
STATE (1959).
11. CoMMIsSIoN ON RACE AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIvE? 13-14
(1958).
12. COMMISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE I.vE? 13-14
(1958). It has been found that ". . . the North is least tolerant toward residential proximity,
while the South is more tolerant toward this than toward desegration in the schools or trans-
portation." Hyman & Sheatsley, Attitude Toward Desegration, Scientific American, Dec.
1956, p. 37. See also, The Negro-White Problem: Principles Versus Practice, Catholic Digest,
Aug. 1956, pp. 9-14; Friederichs, Christians and Residential Exclusion, an Empirical Study of
a Northern Dilemma, 15 Journal of Social Issues, No. 4, pp. 14-23 (1959).
13. Neighbors are likely to be moved to opposition not only by their dislike of living next to
minority group families but also by a belief that their neighborhood has lost status. COM-
MISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 18-19 (1958). Even
more important, however, they are likely to believe that the arrival of a Negro or Spanish-
1961]
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in supervising the policies of those to whom they lend money 4 and real
estate brokers who seek to enforce their own beliefs as to where minority
group families should live. 5 Thus, it requires an assault on a very wide
front to change occupancy patterns.
Fifth, public attention has been concentrated on this problem by a
large number of incidents of intergroup tension (the polite phrase for
racial violence) growing out of housing problems. Names like Cicero,
Levittown, and others without number" remind us that a very high pro-
portion of such incidents outside the South in the last fifteen years have
resulted directly from the movement of Negro families into new areas.
Sixth, increasing attention has been given to the harmful effects of
housing segregation on the population at large. Because of their con-
finement to limited areas, minority group families are vulnerable to ex-
ploitation. They regularly pay more than majority group families for
equivalent accommodations.1 As a result, they are forced into doubling
American family will depress the value of property in which they have invested their savings.
id. at 19-20; MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 622-23 (1944). The belief that minority
occupancy inevitably depresses market values has been firmly implanted by years of real estate
propaganda. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 155-68 (1955). It is only very recently that
this myth is being overcome by objective research. LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE
(1960).
14. U.S. COMM'N ON CIV. RIGHTS REP. 514 (1959); COMMISSION ON RACE AND HouS-
ING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIvE? 29 (1958); MCENTIEE, RESIDENCE AND RACE
218-37 (1960); NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, MORTGAGE FINANCING FOR PROPERTIES
AvAILABLE TO NEGRO OCCUPANCY (1954).
15. See generally MCENTnE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 238-50 (1960). Until 1950, the code
of ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards specifically stated: "A realtor
should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or
occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individual whose presence will clearly
be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood." Id. at 245. In 1950, the Association
modified this provision to read as follows: "A realtor should not be instrumental in intro-
ducing into a neighborhood a character of property or use which will clearly be detrimental
to property values in that neighborhood." Id. at 246. This modification does not seem to
have resulted in any large scale change in practice. Id. at 246; ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGH-
BORS 157 (1955). As recently as 1958, the Commission on Race and Housing stated flatly,
"Real estate brokers, with occasional exceptions, will negotiate the sale or rental of property
to minority persons only in areas where minorities are already living." COMMISSION ON RACE
AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 23 (1958). The Commission also made
it clear that brokers take an "independent view of their responsibilities" and act in this matter
"regardless of the wishes of individual sellers or buyers." Id. at 24. See also U.S. COMM'N
ON CIV. RIGHTS REP. 514-15 (1959).
The owner may also meet with resistance from local municipal and county officials who
can easily make a venture economically impossible by strict and even arbitrary enforcement
of zoning and construction regulations. Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, Scientific Ameri-
can, Oct. 1957, pp. 33-34. See also Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir.
1961), where it was claimed that a project planned for "controlled" Negro-white occupancy
was blocked by arbitrary enforcement of building regulations and use of the power of eminent
domain.
16. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 103-06 (1955); MCENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE
73-75 (1960); MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 678 (1944).
17. "... . [S]egregated groups receive less housing value for their dollars spent than do
whites, by a wide margin." COMMISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING REPORT, WHERE SHALL
WE LIVE? 36 (1958).
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up and other expedients that breed slum conditions, with resulting in-
creases in delinquency, fire losses, depressed health conditions, and other
evils.18 This has been one of the motivations behind legislation against
housing discrimination."9 Also, with the nation encountering increasing
difficulty in providing housing for its expanding population and in elimi-
nating slums and blight, it has been found that "racial discrimination en-
ters into and magnifies every one of the factors producing the crisis."2
Finally, the nation today is "civil rights conscious." If the organized
civil rights groups have accomplished nothing else, they have made the
nation as a whole aware that inequities exist and that the oppressed
minorities are not willing to endure them indefinitely. At least since
publication of the report of President Truman's Committee on Civil
Rights in 1947,21 the issue of civil rights has never left the front pages
for long. It has figured in every national and many local election cam-
paigns. It has been before the United States Supreme Court in important
cases year after year. Perhaps it is too much to say that the conscience
of America has been aroused, but it has certainly been prodded vigorously
and continuously. Unless the climate of the country is radically altered
by war, depression, or other disaster, the civil rights issue will remain on
18. U.S. CommN ON CIV. RIGHTS REP. 386-97 (1959); COMMISSION ON RACE AND
HOUsING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 5, 36-38 (1958); Groner & Helfeld, Race
Discrimination in Housing 57 YALE LU. 426, 428-29 (1948); Linder, The Social Results
of Segregation in Housing, 18 LAw. GUILD REv. 2 (1958).
19. See, for example, the findings in the 1957 New York City Fair Housing Law, NEW
YORK, N. Y., ADMnnsTRATvE CODE § X41-1.0(a) (Supp. 1960-61): "In the City of New
York .... many persons have been compelled to live in circumscribed sections under sub-
standard, unhealthful, unsanitary and crowded living conditions because of discrimination and
segregation in housing. These conditions have caused increased mortality, morbidity, delin-
quency, risk of fire, inter-group tension, loss of tax revenue and other evils. As a result, the
peace, health, safety and general welfare of the entire city and all its inhabitants are threat-
ened."
20. U.S. CoMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS REP. 340 (1959). See also COlMssioN ON RACE
AND HOUSING COMM. REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? 37-40 (1958). Non-white
families are affected to a disproportionate degree by the large-scale displacement of site
tenants which accompanies virtually all urban redevelopment proceedings, as well as many
highway construction and other public improvement projects. This is because these pro-
grams are concentrated in the blighted areas to which minority groups are largely confined.
Thus, from the beginning of the urban renewal program in 1949 up to 1960, slum clearance
and urban renewal projects had relocated 85,000 families. Of the 61,200 families whose
color is known, 69% were non-white. HOUSING & HoMm FINANCE AGENCY, RELOCATION
FROM URBAN RENEWAL PRoJEcT AREAS THROUGH JUNE, 1960, 7 (1961). See also U.S.
COMM'N ON Crv. RIGHTS REP. 480-85 (1959). The fact that most of the housing market is
closed to non-whites seriously complicates the process of relocation. Too often, little or no
effort is made to cope with this problem and, as a result, the displaced non-white families
merely crowd into new areas. As the ghetto is thus moved from one part of the city to an-
other, the usual doubling up occurs with all its attendant evils (see notes 17-18 and accom-
panying text), so that blight is spread almost as fast as it is corrected. In addition, the whole
program of urban renewal is slowed by the fact that municipal planning officials have en-
countered increasing resistance to their plans from non-white groups, who have come to
regard slum clearance as "Negro clearance."
21. PR SmENT's Com. ON Crv. RIGHTS REP., To Sactnt THESE RIGHTS (1947).
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our conscience until it is solved. Inevitably, this means continued and
increased pressure to do away with racial ghettoes.
This article deals primarily with state and local laws enacted during
the last four years prohibiting discrimination in the general housing mar-
ket. Before turning to those laws, however, we review the earlier legal
moves against housing discrimination.
BACKGROUND
Constitutional Protections
During the long period between the Civil War and the last decade,
discrimination in housing flourished with almost no legal restraint. In-
deed, the restraints of law were even used to reinforce ghetto patterns.
The principal defense available to the affected minority groups was the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, backed in part by
the due process clause of the fifth.2 Legislation, as we shall see, was
sparse and ineffective during this period.
The fourteenth amendment was invoked against housing discrimina-
tion in a series of cases that challenged zoning laws adopted by a number
of Southern cities for the purpose of confining Negroes to specified areas.
The United States Supreme Court held these laws and subsequent varia-
tions unconstitutional."
While racial zoning never figured significantly in the housing scene
and was condemned almost as soon as it was started, another legal device
made tremendous impact on housing before it too fell under the ban of
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in part "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws .. " The fifth amend-
ment provides in part "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. Despite the absence of an "equal protection"
clause from the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court has consistently treated the two amend-
ments as equally preventing racial discrimination by government agencies. Thus, in Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), which was the one public school segregation case that
involved the schools in the District of Columbia, the Court said: "tT]he concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive. The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of pro-
hibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are
always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
Similarly, in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), which also involved
the fifth rather than the fourteenth amendment, the Court said that "legislative classification
or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection."
See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 26 (1948); Stagg, Mather & Hough v. Descartes, 244
F.2d 578, 583 (1st Cir. 1957); Pfeiffer Brewing Co. v. Bowles, 146 F.2d 1006, 1007 (Emer.
Cr. App. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865 (1945); United States v. Yount, 267 Fed. 861,
863 (W.D. Pa. 1920).
23. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927);
City of Richmond v. Dean, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). A recent attempt by the City of Birming-
ham, Alabama, to ignore those cases was invalidated in City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185
F.2d 859 (5th Cit. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951).
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the fourteenth amendment. This was the racial restrictive covenant, un-
der which whole communities were subjected to a restriction on purchase,
occupancy, or use by specified minority groups. The device became popu-
lar in all parts of the country and was used against almost every racial,
religious, and national minority2 4 Its effectiveness was destroyed when
the Supreme Court held, in 1948, that enforcement of racial restrictive
covenants by state courts violated the fourteenth amendment.25
The fifth and fourteenth amendments were also invoked to stem the
racial segregation which was very widely practiced in public housing
projects, North and South.2" While the constitutional claim was rejected
in early cases under the "separate but equal" doctrine,'7 the courts have
regularly condemned segregation in public housing since that doctrine
was overturned in the public school cases.28
24. PRESIDENT's COMM. ON CIrv. RIGHTS REPORT, To SEcuRn THESE RIGHTS 68-69
(1947); MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 624 (1944); ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORs
35 (1955).
25. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In a companion case, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24 (1948), the Court barred enforcement of such a covenant by a federal court. It declined
to place its decision on the basis of the fifth amendment but ruled, instead, that such enforce-
ment was prohibited by the provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Star. 27 (1866), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. 1982 (1958), giving all citizens the equal right to possess property.
See notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text. It also relied on the argument that enforcement
was against the public policy of the United States as evidenced in the fourteenth amendment,
saying, "We cannot presume that the public policy of the United States manifests a lesser
concern for the protection of such basic rights against discriminatory action of federal courts
than against such action taken by the courts of the states." 334 U.S. 24, 35-36. The history
of the restrictive covenant litigation is reviewed in detail in VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY
(1959). See also Saks & Rabkin, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Housing: A Report
of Legal Progress, 45 IOWA L. REv. 488, 497-507 (1960).
26. Until recently, most public housing was segregated. McEriRE, REISDmENcE AND RAcE
319 (1960). MYRDAL, AN AmERICAN DILEMMA 625 (1944); Groner and Helfeld, Rae.
Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426, 436 (1948). Most public housing has been
built with Federal assistance under the various federal housing laws dating back to the Hous-
ing Act of 1937 (P.L 412, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.) and prior PWA projects. McEN'mB,
RESIDENCE Am RACE 316 (1960). The federal housing authorities have never barred
segregation in the projects they assist but have striven instead for "racial equity." This policy
was formally adopted by the Public Housing Administration in 1951 (though applied earlier)
in a provision in its Low-Rent Housing Manual of that year (S 102.1, Feb., 1951) and still
in effect. It provided that programs "must reflect equitable provisions for eligible families
of all races, determined on the approximate volume and urgency of their respective needs for
such housing." This, of course, does not bar segregation. Indeed, even since the court de-
cisions condemning segregation in public housing (see note 28, infra), the Federal Govern-
ment has continued to subsidize avowedly segregated housing on the theory that it must leave
this question to local decision. U.S. COMM'N ON CIrv. RIGHTS REP. 473-75 (1959); McGhee
& Ginger, The House I Live In, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 194, 200-02 (1961).
27. See, e.g., Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941) and Mierl v. Housing
Authority of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
28. In Banks v. Housing Authority of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 1, 260 P.2d 668, de-
cided in 1953 while the school segregation cases were pending in the Supreme Court, the
California court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the defendant housing officials to certify
the plaintiff to any housing unit under their management without regard to his race. The
housing authority was operating segregated housing under a plan known as the "neighborhood
pattern policy." The Court rejected its argument that the policy was protected from constitu-
tional attack under the "separate but equal" doctrine. The case was taken to the United
States Supreme Court, which denied the petition for certiorari (347 U.S. 974) one week after
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The constitutional limitations, however, apply only to what the courts
are prepared to view as "state action."29 Hence, there is some question as
to whether they can be used to halt discrimination in what is generally
known as publicly assisted housing; that is, housing owned and operated
by non-governmental corporations or other agencies which have received
some form of assistance from a governmental agency. While efforts to
subject such housing to constitutional restraints have not been very suc-
cessful so far,8° they will no doubt continue and are likely to meet with
it decided the school segregation cases, in which it rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine
at least in the area of education. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This
has generally been taken as an indication that the Court would similarly hold segregation in
public housing unconstitutional, as shown by the fact that the lower courts have regularly
so held since 1954 and no case has been taken to the Supreme Court. Detroit Housing
Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180, 183 (6th Cir. 1955); Davis v. St. Louis Housing Authority,
Civ. No. 8637 (E.D. Mo. 1955), 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 353; Jones v. City of Hamtramck,
121 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Askew v. Benton Harbor Housing Comm'n, Civ. No.
2512 (W.D. Mich. 1956), 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 611, 617; Eleby v. Louisville Municipal
Housing Comm'n, Civ. No. 3240 (W.D. Ky. 1957), 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 815. See also
Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689, 697-98 (5th Cir. 1956); Tate v.
City of Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303, 306 (M.D. Ala. 1958) (dictum). For cases so holding
before the 1954 decisions see Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp.
210 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954);
Seawell v. MacWithey, 2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (1949).
29. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). While the principle is "embedded in our
law," see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948), it has been stretched to cover a lot of
ground. For a recent case, see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715(1961). For general discussions, see State Action, a Study of Requirements under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 1 RACE REL. L. REv. 613 (1956); St. Antoine, Color Blindness but not
Myopia, A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination,
59 MicH. L. REV. 993 (1961).
30. In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950), the New York State Court of Appeals, by a four to three vote, rejected
a claim that the fourteenth amendment, as well as the state constitution, barred discrimination
by a corporation operating a housing project built under the provisions of the state's Re-
development Corporations Law. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 3401-26 (McKinney 1949).
The contract with New York City under which the project was built called for use of the power
of eminent domain to assemble the site, substantial tax exemption, and close city supervision of
the project including maintenance of a ceiling on rents. The court held that a ruling which
applied the fourteenth amendment would jeopardize the "increasing and fruitful participation
of government, both State and Federal, in the industrial and economic life of the nation.... ."
Id. at 535, 87 N.E.2d at 551. It said that extension of the requirement of equality to this area
must be accomplished by "political processes." Id. at 534, 87 N.E.2d 551.
A similar result was reached in a case charging discrimination in a project to be built
under the urban redevelopment provisions of the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 417 (1949),
42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-63 (1958), in Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 174 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ala.
1958), aft'd, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959). In the Court of Appeals, however, one judge
dissented, distinguishing the Dorsey decision on the ground that there was a greater degree
of governmental aid involved under the Federal law.
Efforts to prevent discrimination in FHA developments, on rather vague and apparently
non-constitutional grounds, were rejected in Novick v. Levitt & Sons, 200 Misc. 694, 108
N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1951), af'd, 279 App. Div. 617, 107 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (Sup. Ct
1951); and in Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955). More recently,
however, a state court has upheld the contention that the Constitution bars discrimination in
such projects. Ming v. Horgan, No. 97130, Sacremento County Cal. Super. Ct., 3 RAcE REL.
L. REP. 693 (1958). No appeal was taken from this ruling.
The cases described above are discussed in Saks & Rabkin, Racial and Religious Discrimi.
nation in Housing: A Report of Legal Progress, 45 IowA L. R.Ev. 488, 510-13; Note, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 758, 763-67 (1960); Comment, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1959).
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better reception as the concept of state action continues to expand. More-
over, since almost all publicly-assisted housing receives some form of aid
from the federal government, it may be subjected to a nondiscrimination
requirement by federal executive action. Civil rights groups have given
high priority to the effort, so far unsuccessful, to obtain a Presidential
Executive Order barring discrimination in housing receiving federal as-
sistance, similar to the successive Executive Orders dating back to 1941
barring discrimination in employment by federal contractors.!'
Early Legislation Against Housing Discrimination
The direct legislative approach to discrimination in housing was used
only very sparingly up to recent years. True, one of the civil rights laws
enacted by Congress during the post-Civil War Reconstruction Period
declared that, "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."3"
It is also true that this provision, unlike many of its companions,3 sur-
vives to the present day. Yet, it has had little impact on the course of
events. The prevailing view is that it limits only government action and
thus duplicates the restraints of the fourteenth and fifth amendments.!4
It has been used chiefly as a makeweight in cases decided primarily on
constitutional grounds. 5 No other federal laws on discrimination in
housing have been adopted, although attempts have been made to add
anti-discrimination provisions to pending federal housing bills!'
31. The first order barring discrimination by federal contractors was Exec. Order No. 8802,
6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941). The most recent was Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977
(1961).
Demand for a broad executive order on discrimination in housing receiving federal as-
sistance has been strengthened by the Democratic Party Platform of 1960 which specifically
promised use of "its full executive powers" in combating discrimination and pledged: "Sim-
ilarly the new Democratic Administration will take action to end discrimination in Federal
housing programs, including Federally assisted housing." This pledge was backed by then
Senator Kennedy in a number of speeches which stressed the power of the government to end
discrimination in federal housing by an executive order and gave assurance that he would use
that power if President Eisenhower did not.
32. 14 STAT. 27 (1866), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5 1986 (1958).
33. CAER, FEDERAL PRoTEcrION OF CIvIL RIGHTS: A QUEST FOR A SWORD 35-55 (1957).
Also compare Carr's Appendix 1 which gives the text of the Reconstruction statutes (pp. 221-
251) with Appendix 2 which sets forth the present laws (pp. 251-268). See also KoNVTZ
& LEsKEs, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 43-70 (1961); Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights
Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 370-72 (1953).
34. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331
(1926). See also Comment, 59 COLuM. L REv. 782 (1959).
35. E.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). While the Supreme Court stressed
this statute in Hurd v. Hodge, see note 25 supra, there can be little doubt that the same result
would have been achieved without it.
36. See Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862.1952,
20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 390-91 (1953). Separate bills have been introduced in almost every
session of Congress to bar discrimination in the federal housing program but none has made
any progress. See, e.g., Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.'s bill this year, ER. 544,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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Early state and local laws dealing with housing discrimination fol-
lowed no dear pattern. A 1921 Kansas law prohibited discrimination
by planning commissions." In 1923, Colorado barred racial zoning re-
strictions."8 Illinois, in 1941, prohibited discrimination in hiring minor-
ity groups to construct redevelopment projects,3" and a similar law was
adopted in Indiana in 1945.' A 1919 Minnesota statute which dis-
played a nice sense of delicacy in prohibiting only those restrictive cove-
nants that were based on religion was amended in 1953 to apply also to
racial restrictive covenants.4 '
One of the earliest effective anti-discrimination laws was adopted in
New York State in 1939, applicable to all housing built under the state
housing statutes. It provided simply, "For all the purposes of this chap-
ter, no person shall, because of race, creed, color or national origin be
subjected to any discrimination.""2  Primarily, this meant public hous-
ing."' Thereafter, a number of other states adopted similar prohibitions
of discrimination in public housing, including Massachusetts in 1948,
Connecticut and Wisconsin in 1949, New Jersey in 1950, Rhode Island
and Michigan in 1952, and, most recently, Indiana in 1961."*
Because of the absence of effective enforcement provisions from all
but the latest of these statutes, they accomplished very little. Moreover,
as we have seen, the "separate but equal" doctrine left room, even here,
for segregated facilities. Finally, those statutes that supplied no enforce-
ment provisions added nothing to the prohibition of discrimination by
state agencies already embedded in the fourteenth amendment.
As publicly assisted housing became an important part of the housing
market, pressure began to accumulate for legislation in this area also. An
appealing argument supported such legislation. Housing built with gov-
ernment assistance should be open to all; else, some taxpayers would be
excluded from sharing in benefits made possible by their money. An
early example of legislation prohibiting discrimination in a particular
37. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-713 (1949).
38. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 139-60-10 (1953).
39. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67-1/2, 5 157(9) (Smith-Hurd 1959).
40. IND. ANN. STAT. 5 48-8503(b) (1950).
41. MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 507.18 (1947), as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 507.18 (Supp.
1960).
42. N.Y. PUB. HOUSING LAW 5 223 (1955).
43. While the statute also applies to a small amount of "limited dividend" housing, it seems
clear that this aspect of the law was entirely ignored.
44. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 121, 5 26FF (1957); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53-35 (1958);
WIs. STAT. ANN. S 66A05(2m) (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. 55 55:14A-7.5, 55:1411-5.1,
55:14C-7.1 (Supp. 1960); R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. 5 11-24-3 (1956); MrCu. STAT. ANN. 5
28-343 (Supp. 1959); IND. ANN. STAT. S 10-901 (Supp. 1961), as amended, Ind. Laws
1961, ch. 256.
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form of publicly-assisted housing was that adopted in New York City in
1944, providing that no tax exemption was to be given to any future
projects where discrimination was practiced. 5 The first comprehensive
statute barring discrimination in publicly-assisted housing was the Wicks-
Austin law of New York State in 1950, which applied to all housing re-
ceiving such substantial forms of public aid as tax exemption, land write-
down, and exercise of the power of condemnation.46 In the same year,
New Jersey adopted similar legislation.' In 1953, Connecticut adopted
an amendment to its general civil rights law prohibiting discrimination in
"publicly-assisted" housing, without defining that term."'
By 1954, it had become increasingly evident that public and redevel-
opment housing, which was the principal subject of the laws adopted up
to that date, was only a very small portion even of the publicly-assisted
housing that was being constructed. It was the housing aided by the
Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration that
formed the great bulk of the homes going up with government assistance.
That housing has accounted for the major portion of all non-farm hous-
ing constructed since the war.'
In 1954, New York City adopted the first Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs Law,
barring discrimination in rental housing receiving FHA or VA mortgage
insurance after the effective date of the law.5" The following year, the
New York State Legislature adopted the first Metcalf-Baker Law which
banned discrimination in new apartment housing and also in for-sale
housing in projects of ten or more units, aided by government-insured
mortgages."' At this time also, the Connecticut Civil Rights Commis-
sion, which administers the Connecticut law barring discrimination in
45. NEw YoRK, N.Y. ADwnNISTA.TIvE CODE S J41-1.2 (1957).
46. N.Y. CIrv. RIGHTs LAw, 55 18-a to -3 (Supp. 1961). Support for this law had been
generated by the controversy over the Stuyvesant Town housing development in New York
City, erected by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company with substantial assistance from the
City. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., note 30 supra. However, the statute did not cover
that project because it applied only to housing built after its effective date. See § 18-b(3).
The following year, New York City adopted a local law prohibiting discrimination in pub-
licly assisted housing which followed the formulation of the state law but applied to existing
as well as future housing. NEw YoRK, N.Y. ADmINISTATIE CODE, § W41-1.0 (1957).
Thereafter, the insurance company abandoned its policy of discrimination at Stuyvesant Town.
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. §5 55:14A-7.5, 55:14A-39.1, 55:14B-5.1, 55:14C-7.1, 55:14D-6.1,
55:14E-7.1, 15:16-8.1 (Supp. 1960). Earlier, in 1946, New Jersey had prohibited discrim-
ination in veterans housing. N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 55:14G-21 (Supp. 1960).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53-35 (1960).
49. U.S. CoM 'N ON Civ. RIGHTs REP. 462, 497 (1959). In the early years of its opera-
tions, the FHIA affirmatively recommended use of racial restrictive covenants in FlA defelop-
ments. MYRDAL, AN AMEICAN DII.MMA 349-50 (1944). The subsequent modifications
of this policy are detailed in U.S. Comm'N oN Civ. RIGHTs REP. at 463-67 (1959). See also,
ABRAMiS, FORBmDEN NEIGHBoRs 229-37 (1955).
50. NEW YoRK, N.Y., ADMINISmATnV E CODE 5 W41-1.0(b) (1957).
51. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW 5 18-b(3) (Supp. 1961).
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publicly-assisted housing, ruled that it applied to housing receiving FHA
or VA assistance.5"
In 1957, four additional states, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon,
and Washington, and in 1959, one more, California, adopted laws of
varying degrees of coverage, prohibiting discrimination in housing re-
ceiving government insured mortgages. 3
Meanwhile, attention was also being given to the matter of enforce-
ment procedures. Simple prohibitions accomplish little or nothing in
the area of civil rights and penal provisions accomplish little more.5"
Since enactment of the first fair employment laws in 1945 in New York
and New Jersey, the trend has been toward enforcement through the ad-
ministrative process.55 Starting in 1948, a number of states broadened
the jurisdiction of their fair employment agencies by directing them to
enforce the already existing laws against discrimination in hotels, rail-
roads, and other places of public accommodation." As early as 1949,
Connecticut applied this approach to the matter of discrimination in pub-
lic housing." On a larger scale, the enforcement of the detailed 1950
and 1955 New York laws against discrimination in publicly-assisted hous-
ing, described above, was placed under the jurisdiction of that state's
Commission Against Discrimination by 1956. Today, as we shall see,
most of the major laws against discrimination in housing are adminis-
tered by a general state anti-discrimination agency.5
FAIR HOUSING LAWS
By 1957, the stage had been set for a break-through into the general
private (non-publicly-assisted) housing market. Pressure for action
52. The writer has been informed by the Executive Secretary of the Commission that this
ruling was made at a meeting of the Commission in June, 1955.
53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 35700-35741 (1959); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B,
§§ 1-10 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. 55 18:25-1-28 (Supp. 1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
659.032-.034 (1957) (this was repealed in 1959 by the fair housing law adopted that
year, note 63 infra); WASH. REV. CODE 5 49.60.040 (1959).
54. KoNvrlz & LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 177-80 (1961); Maslow & Robison,
Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 363,
405-06 (1953), and authorities there cited.
55. Robison, The New Fair Employment Law, 20 OHIO ST. LJ. 570-73 (1959).
56. Id. at 573.
57. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-36 (1960).
58. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §5 292(10), 296(3) (1951), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws
1961, ch. 414.
59. The procedure used by these agencies is studied and analyzed in detail in Bamberger &
Lewin, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-discrimination
Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526 (1961).
The text above omits a number of laws, particularly local ordinances and resolutions, deal-
ing with specific types of publicly assisted housing. All the laws adopted up to October 1958
are set forth in full in a publication of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Nondis-
crimination Statutes, Ordinances, and Resolutions Relating to Public and Private Housing
and Renewal Operations (1958).
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in this area had mounted. Moreover, while there was no proof that the
laws against discrimination in publicly-assisted housing had achieved
miracles, it was dear that they had not wrought any disasters."
The lead was taken by New York City at the end of 1957 when it
adopted the second Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs Law, prohibiting discrimination
in a portion of the general housing market - multiple dwellings (build-
ings containing three or more housing units) and one and two family
homes in projects of ten or more units. 1 A year later, a somewhat
broader ordinance was adopted in Pittsburgh. 2
In 1959, four states enacted fair housing laws of varying degrees of
coverage - Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Oregon.' In
1961, additional laws were enacted in Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania," and the New York City, Connecti-
cut, and Massachusetts laws were strengthened in a number of respects.'
In a number of other states, fair housing bills received active considera-
tion and are quite likely to be passed during the next few years."6
Terms of the Various Fair Housing Laws
The eleven laws mentioned above vary greatly both in their sub-
stantive provisions and in their enforcement procedures. Of prindpal
importance is the "primary coverage"; that is, the kinds of housing as to
which the law prohibits discrimination by the owner in sales and rentals.
Primary Coverage
The broadest law is that of New York City, as amended in 1961.
It applies to all housing except the rental of one of the apartments in a
60. U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RUGHTs REP. 309-406 (1959); COMmISSiON ON RAcE AND
HOUSING REPORT, WHE SHALL WE LrvE? 48 (1958).
61. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMiNsTRxTAvE CODE S X41-1.0 (Supp. 1960-61).
62. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 523, Dec. 15, 1958; recorded in Vol. 62, p. 303, office
of City Clerk.
63. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-7-1--69-7-7 (Supp. 1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§5 53-35 to -36 (1960) (enforced pursuant to §§ 31-122-31-128); MASS. GEN. IAWS
ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (1957); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010-.115, as amended, Ore.
Laws (1959), ch. 584.
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.13 (1953), as amended, WEST's Mn.TN. SESs. LAW
SERV. ch. 428 (1961). (The law as it applies to housing does not take effect until December
31, 1962). N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. 5§ 354.1-4 (1955), as amended, N.H. Laws 1961, ch.
219; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-1-18:25-28 (Supp. 1960), as amended, N.J. Laws 1961,
ch. 106; N.Y. EXECUTIVE- LAW §§ 290-99, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 414; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (Supp. 1960), as amended, PURDON'S PA. LEG. SERV. No. 19,
Mar. 13, 1961.
65. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMISTRATIVE CODE S X41-1.0 (Supp. 1960-61), as amended by
1961 Local Law No. 642; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (1960), as amended, WEST's
CONN. LEG. SERV. No. 472 (1961); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, 5§ 1-10 (1957),
as amended, Law. Co-op. LEG. SERv. chs. 128, 570 (1961).
66. See NAT'L COMM. AGAINST DISCRuMINATION IN HOUSING, TRENDS IN HOUSING 2
(May-June 1961).
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two family home, where the other apartment is occupied by the owner."7
This is the only law now in effect that applies to the sale or rental of
single family homes occupied by the owner.
The new Minnesota law applies to all housing except the rental of an
apartment in an owner-occupied two family home and the sale or rental
of an owner-occupied one family home. However, this last exception
does not apply if the home is covered by a government insured mortgage
or has received other forms of public assistance.
The Colorado law applies to all housing except "places maintained
by the owner or lessee as the household of his family." It is not dear
whether this extends to rentals or sales of an owner-occupied two-family
home.
Pennsylvania prohibits discrimination in all housing except owner-
occupied one and two family homes.
Oregon uses a somewhat different approach. Its law applies to any
person who sells or leases real property "as a business enterprise" or "in
connection with or as an incident to his business enterprise."
The New Hampshire law is difficult to classify. It rather am-
biguously prohibits discrimination "in the matter of rental or occupancy
of a dwelling in a building containing more than one dwelling." It is
not clear whether this applies to sales as well as rentals.
The remaining states substantially limit the scope of their laws by
numerical minimums. The Connecticut law applies to owners of three
or more housing units on contiguous land. This covers both the owner
of a three unit building and the owner of three single homes. The
Pittsburgh ordinance places the minimum at five housing units without
regard to contiguity. The New York State law applies to all multiple
dwellings; that is, buildings with three or more units.6" As to one
and two family buildings, the minimum is ten units and they must be
located on contiguous land. The Massachusetts law similarly applies to
multiple dwellings and one and two family homes in developments of
ten or more contiguous units. However, it also applies to housing which
was at any time one of ten or more lots on a tract which was submitted
to a planning board under the state's Subdivision Control Law.69 The
New Jersey law applies to all real property except owner-occupied one,
two, and three family buildings and those one and two family buildings
67. This and a number of other laws also contain exemptions for the renting of rooms
within an apartment to "roomers" and "boarders." Even in the absence of such a provision,
it is unlikely that any of the laws would be invoked in the matter of such rentals.
68. Although the law applies generally to all buildings with three or more units, there is a
provision that, in counting the number of families in the building, the residence of the owner
of the building shall be excluded. This excludes from the coverage of the law owner-occupied
three family dwellings.
69. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 41, 55 81K-81GG (1932).
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that are not in developments of ten or more houses constructed or to be
constructed on contiguous land.
The provisions described above are those applicable to "housing,"
that is, buildings available for human occupancy. However, a number of
the laws go beyond this. The New York State law applies also to "com-
mercial space," that is, space in a building designed for manufacture, sale,
storage, and other business and professional purposes. The Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Oregon laws apply to all "real property" and therefore
include not only commercial space but also vacant land. The Pittsburgh
ordinance applies to vacant land that is "available" for housing accommo-
dations. The Connecticut and New York State laws include vacant land
if the owner has indicated his intention to build housing on it.
Prohibited Conduct by Owners and Their Agents
All the laws except those in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New
York City use detailed language to prohibit discrimination based on race,
religion, or national origin"° not only in selling and renting the covered
housing but also in the terms and conditions of a sale or lease. The
New York City law is less detailed, containing no provision on terms
and conditions. The Connecticut law differs from the others in a num-
ber of respects, chiefly because it is not basically a fair housing law.
This state prohibited discrimination in housing by adding housing ac-
commodations to the definition of "place of public accommodation" in
the law prohibiting discrimination in such institutions as hotels, rail-
roads, and bathing beaches. The prohibition applies to "denial of such
accommodations." The New Hampshire law is also primarily a law
against discrimination in places of public accommodation. As already
noted, its terms apply only to "rental or occupancy," leaving some doubt
as to its scope.71
Real Estate Brokers
Most of the statutes have express language making them apply not
only to owners but also to their "agents." Even without such provisions,
it may be assumed that a real estate agent who discriminates on instruc-
tions from his principal is participating in an illegal practice. However,
that does not, by itself, take care of the whole problem of discrimination
by real estate brokers. As we have seen, there is substantial evidence that
70. The Colorado law also prohibits discrimination based on "sex" but at the same time
provides that the act shall not bar any person from "leasing premises only to members of one
sex." It is nor easy to see how these two provisions are to be administered.
71. To a greater or lesser extent, the laws also prohibit discriminatory advertising, use of ap-
plication forms containing discriminatory questions and discriminatory oral inquiries and rec-
ords concerning race, religion, or national origin. These provisions may apply to real estate
agents and financial institutions as well as owners.
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much of the discrimination in housing is generated by real estate brokers
who, on their own motion and independent of instructions from home
owners, refrain from showing property in specified areas to minority
groups they regard as undesirable.72 Moreover, even when the broker's
discrimination has the approval of the principal, that fact cannot always
be shown. Hence, the laws in Massachusetts,' Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York State, and New York City contain specific provisions prohibit-
ing discrimination by real estate brokers and salesmen in all housing in
which discrimination is prohibited on the part of the owner. The Oregon
and Pittsburgh laws go further. Although the primary coverage of the
Oregon law, as already noted, is limited to persons engaged in the busi-
ness of selling real property, a separate provision makes it illegal for a
real estate broker or salesman to accept a listing of any "real property"
with the understanding "that a purchaser may be discriminated against."'"
The Pittsburgh law, in which the primary coverage has a limitation of
five or more units, prohibits discrimination by real estate brokers and
salesmen as to all housing and vacant land available for housing.
In California and Connecticut, the activities of real estate agents have
been reached by a different route. In each of these states it has been
ruled that real estate agents fall within the scope of the law prohibiting
discrimination in places of public accommodation."h
Financial Institutions
As in the case of real estate brokers, there is substantial evidence that
some discrimination originates with banks, insurance companies, and
other financial institutions, independent of the instructions of the seller
or renter. Thus it is claimed that minority groups are sometimes pre-
vented from buying property in specified areas, even after they have con-
cluded a sales agreement with a willing owner, because they find it
impossible to obtain a mortgage from any financial institution."m
72. See note 15 supra.
73. In Massachusetts, a separate statute makes a violation of the anti-discrimination law by a
real estate broker grounds for suspension or revocation of his license. MASS. GEN. Lws
ANN. ch. 112, 5 87AAA (Supp. 1960), as amended, LAW. Co-oP. LEG. SERv. ch. 181 (1961).
74. In Oregon, as in Massachusetts, a separate law permits the suspension or revocation of a
license of a real estate broker who violates the anti-discrimination law. ORE. REV. STAT. S
696.300(1) (1957).
75. In Connecticut, the ruling was announced by the Commission on Civil Rights in a letter
from its chairman, Allen F. Jackson, dated December 15, 1955, to Charles M. Lyman, counsel
to the New Haven Real Estate Board. Copies of the letter were then sent to all licensed real
estate agents and brokers in the state.
In California the ruling was made by the State Attorney General. OPs. CALIF. A=rY.
GEN. No. 59/294 (Nov. 23, 1959). The validity of this ruling is now being litigated See
Vargas v. Hampson, now on appeal in the California Supreme Court (No. LA-26594).
A similar ruling was made by the Attorney General of Massachusetts before the 1961 laws
on this subject were passed. MASS. CoMM'N AGAINST DIscIMINATiON ANN. REnP. 6-8
(1958-59).
76. See note 14 supra.
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The laws in Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
New York City deal with this by expressly prohibiting discrimination
by financial institutions in housing within the primary coverage of the
various laws. New York State and Pittsburgh go further. New York
State prohibits discrimination by financial institutions as to all housing
accommodations and commercial space, and Pittsburgh as to all housing
and vacant land available for housing, without regard to the limitations
in the primary coverage."
Enforcement Provisions
All but one of the laws described above follow the trend toward
administrative enforcement already mentioned. The exception is the
New Hampshire statute, which provides only that violators may be fined
$10 to $100.8 The New York City and Pittsburgh laws, enacted under
the limited powers of municipalities, lack the full-dress provisions of the
usual administrative statute. They provide for the filing of complaints
with an administrative agency, which has power to investigate, to attempt
conciliation, and to hold a public hearing. If that does not halt discrimina-
tion, the agency must turn the matter over to the city's law officer to bring
enforcement proceedings in the courts. The remaining statutes all pro-
vide for enforcement by the state agency that has jurisdiction over dis-
crimination in employment and places of public accommodation. The
ultimate sanction is the usual provision for a court-enforced agency
order."9
Two unusual features of the enforcement provisions may be men-
tioned. The newly enacted Minnesota law was amended in its final stage
in the legislature to provide that, when a proceeding is brought in court
to review or enforce an order of the administrative agency, the proceed-
ing "shall be de novo and the person complained against shall be entitled,
at his request, to a trial by jury." This provision could seriously impair
the effectiveness of the new law.
77. In addition, Washington, which prohibits discrimination only in publicly-assisted hous-
ing (see note 53 supra), has empowered its anti-discrimination agency to prevent any institu-
tion from requiring a designation of race, creed, or national origin on any application for
credit. WAsIF. REv. CoDE. S 49.60.175 (1959). This does not appear to prohibit the actual
practice of discrimination.
78. The New Hampshire statute amended a 1919 law which prohibited discriminatory ad-
vertising, but not discrimination itself, by places of public accommodation, such as hotels,
restaurants, and theatres. The 1961 law replaced the prohibition of discriminatory advertising
by a prohibition of discrimination itself in places of public accommodation, while also adding
the provision on housing described above. However, the legislature indicated its fears as to
the boldness of the action it was taking by amending the penalty clause of the 1919 law so as
to remove the provision for a jail sentence of 30 to 90 days.
79. Some of the statutes have retained other sanctions that were in effect before the anti-
discrimination agency was given jurisdiction. Thus, in Connecticut, violators of the law may
be fined $25 to $100 or imprisoned up to 30 days, or both.
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An amendment adopted in Massachusetts this year is designed to deal
with a problem that is particularly acute under fair housing laws, includ-
ing those dealing with publicly-assisted housing. It frequently happens
that, by the time the statutory proceedings have been completed, there is
no house or apartment available for the complainant."0 To meet this
problem, Massachusetts this year adopted an amendment to its 1959 fair
housing law. This provides that, after the administrative agency has
investigated a complaint and made an initial determination that there is
probable cause to credit its allegations, it may file a petition in court seek-
ing appropriate injunctive relief pending final determination of the
proceedings. The court is to grant "such relief, as it deems just and
proper."
Analysis of Statutory Provisions
The wide divergence among the various laws on the scope of coverage
reflects a number of practical considerations, chief among which is legis-
lative strategy. Thus, numerical limitations are dictated primarily by
the fact that a limited bill has a better chance of enactment.
Sometimes, the limitations are introduced while the bill is pending,
as a part of the process of compromise that figures so large in any
deliberative body."' At other times, the limitations appear in the bill as
originally introduced with the support of the organized civil rights
forces.82 That is done without any concession that principle requires ex-
clusion of the small landowner but merely in recognition of the efficacy
of the step-by-step process.
In fact, however, sound practical arguments can be made for these
limitations, particularly the exclusion of the owner-occupied home. Should
not the government be concerned primarily with those who deal in hous-
80. This problem is discussed in Bamberger & Lewin, The Right to Equal Treatment: Ad-
ministrative Enforcement of Anti-discrimination Legislation, 74 HARV. L REV. 526, 550-51
(1961).
81. For example, the bill enacted this year in New York State was a slightly more limited
bill than that sponsored unsuccessfully the previous year by the Republican administration.
That, in turn, had been offered as a compromise with the far broader bill backed both years
by the New York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing, which co-ordinates the
housing activities of the civil tights organizations in the state.
In New Jersey, the bill ultimately passed was first approved in the lower house in the
form supported by the New Jersey Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. In that
form, its primary coverage was equivalent to that of the bill later passed in New York City.
See note 67 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the bill contained a provision for
interim relief similar to that adopted in Massachusetts. See note 80 supra and accompanying
text. In the Senate, the latter provision was stricken and the primary coverage was cut down
close to that of the New York state law, approved earlier in the year. The Assembly then
concurred in the Senate amendments to insure passage of a bill.
82. In New York State, the 1950 Wicks-Austin law and the 1955 Metcalf-Baker law dealing
with publicly-assisted housing were both adopted in the form originally proposed by the New
York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing.
[Vol. 13:1
Robison, Housing
ing as a business, to the exclusion of the seller who enters the market
only because he is moving from one residence to another? The Oregon
law, as we have seen, is expressly based on that distinction. The large
commercial operators, together with the real estate brokers, play a large,
and perhaps, the largest, part in setting patterns of occupancy. Once
they abandon segregation, the market as a whole is likely to follow.
Administrative considerations also count here. Proof of discrimina-
tion frequently rests on showing a pattern of conduct - of repeated
rejection of a particular minority group over a period of time.8' This
line of investigation is not available in the case of the single home owner.
Also, the agency can use more effective enforcement and policing tech-
niques in the case of operators who stay in the housing industry.
However, omission of the owner-occupied home leaves a large part
of the housing market uncovered by a non-discrimination requirement.8 4
It has been estimated that the 1961 fair housing law in New York State
covers only about twenty per cent of the housing outside New York
City. 5 Leaving so large a part of the total supply subject to unlimited
restriction may make it impossible to achieve a truly open market or to
give substantial relief to those in need of it.
Moreover, this part of the market is particularly important to the
under-privileged minority group families. Much of the new housing is
closed to them by economics, regardless of whether the law has removed
the racial barrier. It is only in the largest urban areas that apartment
houses are a significant factor. Elsewhere, the poorer families must look
primarily to the large supply of older single-family houses.
Finally, as we shall see, a prohibition of discrimination in this sector
may be necessary to deal effectively with discrimination by real estate
brokers in their dealings with such properties.
The New York City law, as amended this year, covers this part of
the housing market. Experience under that law will show whether sig-
nificant gains can be made in dealing with discrimination in the sale
of owner-occupied single family homes.
The inclusion of vacant land under a number of the laws is unques-
83. Note, An American Legal Dilemma - Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. CL L. REv. 107,
120-122 (1949).
84. There is little argument about the exclusion of roomers and boarders and of the rental
of an apartment in a two family house in which the owner occupies the other apartment.
Where this degree of "*togetherness" is involved, legislators are quite naturally inclined to
give the owner latitude in deciding who will live in his home. In the sale of owner-occupied
single homes, that is not a factor; the seller is gone by the time the buyer moves in.
85. In a statement issued February 18, 1961, while the New York bill was pending in the
legislature, the New York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing said that the pend-
ing bill would cover less than twenty per cent of the housing in upstate New York. It gave
figures for specific areas ranging from twenty-five per cent for Westchester and Nassau Coun-
ties, next to New York City, to seventeen per cent in the Buffalo Standard Metropolitan Area,
at the other end of the state. N.Y. TmEs, Feb. 19, 1961, p. 72, col. 1.
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tionably a valuable provision. Minority groups are discriminated against
in the purchase of building lots, both those on which the developer does
the building after the sale and those in which the buyer acquires nothing
more than the tide. However, the inclusion of commercial space, as in
the New York State law, is probably worth very little. The writer knows
of no evidence that discrimination in such property has become a prob-
lem.
There is hardly any question that discrimination by real estate brokers
should be prohibited, at least as to all housing within a statute's primary
coverage. If an owner may not discriminate, a broker should not be
allowed to encourage him to discriminate, to aid him to do so, or to dis-
criminate for him without his knowledge or instructions.
It is particularly important to cover brokers in the case of single
family homes. As already noted, it is difficult both to prove discrimina-
tion by the single family home owner and to remedy its effects. In fact,
it may well be that, as such homes are brought under the various laws,
following the example in New York City, enforcement will be accom-
plished primarily by dealing with the brokers. Even though few actions
are taken against owners, the fact that they are not allowed to discriminate
will make it easier to deal with their agents.
As to housing not within the primary coverage, it seems proper at
least to forbid the initiation of discrimination by brokers. The state
should be able to reach effectively the all too frequent practice of simply
not showing housing in a specified area to certain minorities. Where
that is done without instructions from, or even the knowledge of, the
owner, it is an unwarranted limitation on his opportunity to sell.
No statute directed specifically at this practice has yet been adopted.
Its drafting presents some problems. If the broker is allowed to dis-
criminate on instructions from the owner, must the instructions be in
writing? If that requirement is not imposed, the prohibition may be
difficult to enforce. But requiring written instructions would come close
to prohibiting discrimination by the owner, since few would be willing
to sign their names to such instructions.
The Pittsburgh and Oregon laws, however, go further and prohibit
discrimination by real estate brokers even on instructions from the owner.
Thus, the Oregon law prohibits brokers from accepting discriminatory
listings. The theory here is that the owner may discriminate but, if he
does, he may not use the services of a broker licensed by the state. There
has been strong legislative opposition to this type of provision. It is
argued that it places the broker in an almost impossible position and that,
as to the owner, it takes away with one hand what is given with the other.
As to financial institutions, there are no corresponding reasons why
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provisions barring discrimination should be confined to the area of pri-
mary coverage. When financial institutions discriminate, they do so as
principals. Hence provisions like those in the New York State and Pitts-
burgh laws barring discrimination in financing as to all housing seem
entirely appropriate.
Constitutionality of Fair Housing Laws
Unlike their predecessors in the areas of public accommodations, em-
ployment, and education, the fair housing laws have led to substantial
litigation in which their validity has been challenged. The early laws
on discrimination in public accommodations, familiarly known until re-
cently as "civil rights laws," were challenged from time to time and were
uniformly held constitutional.86 On the two occasions such laws came
before the United States Supreme Court, the question of their constitu-
tionality generally was not raised. The issue, in one case, involved in-
terference with foreign commerce" and, in the other, the powers of the
former District of Columbia legislature.88 In the latter case, the Supreme
Court expressed in a dictum its assurance that such laws were a valid
exercise of the police power.8"
Prior to enactment of the first broad fair employment law in 1945,
a narrower law prohibiting discrimination by labor unions"u was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court. Appellant's claim that the law
violated the fourteenth amendment was described by the Court as "a dis-
tortion of the policy manifested in that amendment which was adopted to
prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the
basis of race or color."'" This firm decision probably accounts for the
86. Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920); Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo.
241, 35 P.2d 848 (1934); Baylies v. Curry, 128 IMI. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889); Pickett v.
Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N.E. 667 (1926); Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239
Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927); Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa, 89, 123 N.W. 231
(1910); Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898); Messenger v. State, 25 Neb.
674,41 N.W. 638 (1889); People v. King, 110 N.Y. 414, 18 N.E. 245 (1888); Commission
v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412 (1915).
In addition, the Supreme Court in 1907 upheld a law calling for equal treatment in public
places but without any mention of race. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359
(1907).
A possible departure from the uniform pattern occurred in Marshall v. Kansas City, No.
622,387, Jackson County Mo. Civ. Ct., July 1, 1960, in which the court held a Kansas City
ordinance barring discrimination in public places unconstitutional. Since the court issued no
opinion, it is quite possible that the decision was based not on broad due process grounds but
on the argument, pressed by counsel, that the state had not empowered the city to adopt such
legislation. An appeal has been taken to the state supreme court.
87. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
88. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
89. The Court said: "And certainly as far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is
no doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the use of
facilities serving a public function is within the police power of the states." Id. at 109.
90. N.Y. Cv. RIGH-S LAw, § 43 (Supp. 1961).
91. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945).
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fact that none of the broad fair employment laws has yet been put to the
test in the courts. 2
In contrast, the housing laws, with only a comparatively brief history,
have prompted a substantial amount of litigation. That is again an
indication of the depth of resistance to efforts to end discrimination in
housing. Apparently, owners of housing believe that far more is at stake
under an anti-discrimination order than do employers and resort owners.9'
Even the more limited laws that prohibit discrimination in FHA
housing have been tested in three cases. In New York, the owner of a
rental development covered by an FHA-insured mortgage challenged an
order issued by the State Commission Against Discrimination. New
York Supreme Court Justice Eager rejected his claims that the law as
drafted did not apply to him and that it was unconstitutional.94 On the
due process issue, Justice Eager said: "I am satisfied that the legislature
did act within the bounds of the police power in enacting provisions
against racial and religious discrimination in publicly-assisted housing
accommodations."95  No appeal was taken from this decision.
Thereafter, in New Jersey, the owners of the mammoth Levittown
housing development resisted application of that state's law against dis-
crimination in publicly-assisted housing. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed the finding that the statute applied to the project and,
although the point was not raised, strongly implied that such laws do
not violate due process requirements. 6
An order issued by the Washington State Board Against Discrimina-
tion against the owner of a single FHA-financed home, however, re-
suited in an adverse decision. There, a lower court held the law a viola-
tion of the due process clause, at least as applied to a single home
owner. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court ruled against the
law by a five to four vote. Three of the five judges in the majority held
the statute invalid, under both the state and federal constitutions, on the
ground that it made an unreasonable classification between housing hav-
ing a federally insured loan and all other housing. The other two ma-
jority judges condemned the law on a number of grounds, including due
process, unreasonable classification, improper delegation of power, and
92. The various cases that have reached the courts under the state fair employment laws are
noted in Robison, The New Fair Employment Law, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 570, 580-81 (1959).
93. It has also been suggested that "a reputation for discrimination may even enhance the
reputation of a broker or builder...." Bamberger & Lewin, The Right to Equal Treatment:
Administrative Enforcement of Anti-discrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REV. 526, 541
(1961).
94. New York State Commission Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, 10
Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
95. id. at 342, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
96. Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 531, 158 A.2d
177, 185-86 (1960).
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unreasonable interference with "private affairs." Thus, only two mem-
bers of the court ruled on grounds that would upset a general fair housing
law.9
7
The first housing law applicable to the general housing market, the
New York City law of 1957, was challenged even before it went into
operation. A landlord in that city announced his intention to test the
constitutionality of the law and on the day before the law's effective date
posted a sign in his building with the blunt statement: "I am refusing to
show apartments to Negroes on constitutional grounds." It was not until
1959 that a proceeding against him reached the state court. At that
time, the supreme court held, in a brief decision, that the law was dearly
constitutional. 8 No appeal was taken.
Subsequently, the laws of Colorado, Connecticut, and Massachusetts
were involved in litigation. In Colorado, a trial court has held the law
unconstitutional and an appeal is pending in the state supreme court. 9
In Connecticut, a builder asked the court to set aside a commission order
both on the ground that the law was unconstitutional and on the ground
that it did not apply to his operations. The court upheld the second con-
tention but took occasion to express its opinion in detail that the consti-
tutional claims were not well founded."tu The Massachusetts proceeding
has not yet reached a decision in any court." 1
Despite the adverse decisions in Washington and Colorado, the case
for the constitutionality of these laws is very strong, as almost all com-
mentators agree."' 2 Since the arguments have frequently been set forth
in detail, a summary may suffice here.
97. O'Meara v. Washington State Board, No. 535996, King County Super. Ct., July 31, 1959.
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington on September 29, 1961.
The three judges who relied on the equal protection ground expressly noted: "The power of
the legislature to vest the appellant-board with authority to order any or all owners to sell
their homes to particular persons is not presented."
Although the court relied on the state as well as the federal constitution, consideration is
being given to seeking review by the United States Supreme Court on the theory that the
state court treated the federal and state constitutional issues as identical.
98. Martin v. City of New York, 22 Misc.2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
99. Case v. Colorado And-Discrimination Comm'n, Civ. Ac. No. 39682, El Paso County
Colo. Dist. Ct., June 2, 1961.
100. Swanson v. Commission on Civil Rights, No. 94802, New Haven County Conn. Super.
Ct., July 11, 1961.
101. Fowler v. A. J. Colangelo, described in MASS. COMM'N AGAINST DIScRIMINATION
ANN. REP. 15 (1960).
102. McGhee & Ginger, The House I Live In, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 194, 228-36 (1961);
Comment, Constitutional Aspects of Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing, 26
Fordham L. Rev. 675, 677-80 (1957-8); Note, Racial Discrimination in Housing, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 515, 525-30 (1959); Note, Prospects for Supreme Court Approval of Anti-Bias
Housing Statutes, 45 VA. L. REv. 428 (1959); Comment, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1958);
Note, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 758, 778 (1960); Ross & Freedman, The Constitutionality of
a Bill Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing, 18 LAw. GuiLD REV. 30 (1958). On the con-
stitutionality of laws against discrimination in publicly-assisted housing, see Forster & Rabkin,
The Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publily-Assisted Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F.
38 (1960); Bamberger & Lewin, The Right of Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement
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In any constitutional test, the proponents of the legislation will seek
victory by a pincers movement. One thrust will be along the line of cases,
already mentioned, regularly sustaining laws prohibiting discrimination
based on race, religion, or national origin in areas other than housing -
particularly employment and public places."'a The other thrust will start
from the decisions generally upholding welfare legislation and rejecting
the nineteenth century doctrine of "freedom of contract."'"14 It will move
along the line of cases specifically upholding restraints on owners of real
property with respect to land usage" 5 and rents.0 . and generally declar-
ing that "there is no such inherent difference in property in land, from
that in tangible and intangible personal property, as exempts it from the
operation of the police power in appropriate cases,.. .", The point at
which these two lines of cases intersect is that occupied by fair housing
legislation.
Power for these two thrusts will come from the convincing evidence,
already referred to, that the legislation is designed to deal with a pressing
evil. ' 8 This evidence, plus the familiar presumption of validity of legis-
lation having a reasonable basis, provides a strong case for any fair hous-
ing law.
In the long run, however, the most telling argument is likely to be
the one stressed by the Supreme Court in its 1945 decision upholding the
New York law against discrimination by unions - that it would be in-
congruous to invalidate a law aimed at racial equality by invoking a
constitutional amendment passed to do away with the effects of slavery.
As Justice Frankfurter said in that case, "To use the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a sword against such State power would stultify that Amend-
ment."109
of Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526, 586-88 (1961); Note, The New
Jersey Housing Anti-Bias Law: Applicability to Non-State-Aided Developments, 12 RUTGERs
L. REV. 557, 558-67 (1958).
The opposite conclusion was reached in Avins, Trade Regulations, 12 RUTGERs L. Rv.
149, 150-60 (1957); Avins, Anti-Discrimination As An Infringement on Freedom of Choice,
6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960); Note, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as it Affects Real Property
Rights, 23 ALBANY L. REV. 75 (1959).
103. See notes 86-92 supra and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); United States v. Caro-
lene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
105. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926); Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S.
394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
106. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Levy Leasing Co., Inc. v. Siegel, 258
U.S. 242 (1922); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
107. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 247 (1922). For an early expression of this
view, see United States v. Distillery in West Front Street, 25 Fed. Cas. 866, 867 (No. 14965)
(D. Del. 1870).
108. See notes 2-20 supra and accompanying text.
109. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945).
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PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
A substantial part of the population now lives in states having fair
housing legislation. The nine states having such laws have a population
of 49,395,683, or 27.5% of the country's total population of 179,323,-
175, according to the 1960 Census. Of the total non-white population
of 20,491,443, the nine states have 3,259,971, or 15.9%. They num-
ber an estimated 3,712,400 Jews, or 67.1% of the country's estimated
total of 5,531,500.110
The roll of states with fair housing laws will undoubtedly grow in
the years ahead. Assuming that the courts establish the validity of these
laws, the demand for further legislation will certainly continue. In 1963,
when most of the state legislatures meet again, vigorous campaigns can
be expected in such states as Alaska, California, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. In the states that have al-
ready acted, efforts will be made to broaden the coverage of the laws
to include owner-occupied houses. In addition, there will be virtually
continuous activity to obtain municipal legislation such as that in New
York City and Pittsburgh.
This continued demand will not necessarily constitute proof that the
laws have had direct, measurable results. It is still too early to draw any
elaborately documented conclusions as to the success or failure of the
fair housing laws so far enacted. Indeed, we do not even have satisfactory
110. The 1960 census (Census Bureau, Series PC(l), General Population Characteristics)
gives the figures below for total and non-white population. The figures for the Jewish popu-
lation are the most widely used estimates, appearing in AMmucAN JEWISH YEARBOoK 1961
62-63.
Totl Non-white Jewish
Population Population Population
Colorado ------------------------ 1.753,947 53,247 21,300
Connecticut ---------------------- 2,535,234 111,418 101,300
Massachusetts ------------ ----- 5,148,578 125,434 226,100
Minnesota ----------------------- 3,413,864 42,261 34,900
New Hampshire----------------- 606,921 2,587 5,200
New Jersey-------------------- 6,066,782 527,779 326,300
New York ---------------------- 16,782,304 1,495,233 2,533,900
Oregon -------------------------- 1,768,687 36,650 8,800
Pennsylvania - ----- 11,319,366 865,362 454,600
9-state Total --------------------- 49,395,683 3,259,971 3,712,400
U.S. Total------------------- 179,323,175 20,491,443 5,531,500
It should be noted that these figures do not show any close correlation between the propor-
tion of non-whites in a state and the enactment of fair housing legislation. For example, New
York and New Jersey, with a relatively high proportion of non-whites, were both tardy and
cautious in enacting fair housing laws. On the other hand, two of the earliest and broadest
laws were enacted in Colorado and Oregon, each of which has a very small non-white popula-
tion. It seems likely that the presence of a large non-white population increases both support
for such legislation and resistance to it.
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information on just how much has been accomplished under the older
laws against discrimination in employment and public places.11'
Rather, the demand will reflect the urgent need felt by Negroes and
other minorities to combat the evil of housing discrimination. Enactment
of a law is a visible symbol of progress - a public condemnation of bias
- even before it turns a single key in a formerly withheld apartment or
split-level.
At this point, we can at least say that the fair housing laws have not
aroused violent resistance, nor have they hampered housing construction
or financing." 2  On the other hand, they have caused no sudden mil-
lennium. We still have ghettoes. It is probable that only a small number
of Negro and other minority group families can be said to be living in
integrated situations as a result of the legislation. The various enforce-
ment commissions are able to report successes in specific cases,1 3 and ef-
forts will no doubt be made, both by agency personnel and by interested
civic groups, to make the procedures under the laws both faster and more
comprehensive. Yet the laws are not likely to bring about extensive
change unless there is a large amount of voluntary compliance without
administrative action.
There are some signs that that is taking place," 4 but no convincing
proof. A recent survey by the National Committee Against Discrimina-
tion in Housing arrived at the following conclusions: that a substantial
number of middle income minority group families have moved into
housing previously denied to them, that the laws have been a potent
educational force, that the real estate industry has cooperated in some
111. Thus, the Commission on Race and Housing in its Report says: "It is difficult to
evaluate the effects of current anti-discrimination laws with any precision." It concludes,
however: "On the whole, it is the consensus of observers that the laws have played a signifi-
cant, if not measurable, role in the decline of racial discrimination during the past decade or
two." CoMMISSIoN ON RACE AND HOusING RiEPoRT, WHERE SHALL WE LivE? 47
(1949).
112. U.S. COmm'N ON Civ. RIGHs REP. 399-406 (1959). When the first of these laws
was pending in New York City, the Real Estate Board of New York ran an advertisement that
appeared in the New York Times and other metropolitan papers on July 29, 1957. It said,
in part: "This proposed law, we genuinely believe, will do more harm to racial relationships
than anything else conceivably could.
"The proposed law would cause many more families to leave the city. Would depress real
estate values. Would affect the basis of the City's taxation and its credit. Would undo much
of the success we've had in amicable living." N.Y. TIMES July 29, 1957, (advertisement).
So far, at least, these predictions have not been validated.
113. See, for example, MASS. COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 15TH ANN. REP. 9
(1960).
114. In a speech to the first anniversary luncheon of the New York City Commission on
Intergroup Relations, April 1, 1959, its executive director, Dr. Frank S. Home, said: "It has
been encouraging to observe, through the complaints procedure, many evidences of voluntary
compliance with the law. In a number of cases we have found that buildings controlled by
the respondents were, in fact, integrated. Also, from various sources we have learned that
several large scale ownership corporations which handle rental and management of their own
properties took steps immediately after the enactment of the law to conform with it."
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areas and its opposition generally has been less than expected, and that
real estate values have not dropped nor has building construction de-
clined. On the other hand, it found that the number of minority group
families using the laws "has been disappointingly small," that the hous-
ing is often no longer available when the administrative process has been
completed, and that the laws have been used predominantly by middle
and upper middle class families." 5
The laws against discrimination in housing will probably help to
lower the formal barriers imposed by discriminatory practices on the
part of those who control the housing market. There is no assurance,
however, that the lowered barriers will be crossed in large numbers by
the minority groups they were erected to exclude. Economic, social, and
cultural handicaps as well as long-entrenched custom tend to direct
minority group families looking for housing into areas where they know
they will be accepted. 6 Moreover, it cannot be denied that a Negro
family that moves into an all-white neighborhood at least takes a chance
that it will receive an unfavorable reception. Even if the family is well-
received, it is likely to be isolated. These factors have operated to in-
hibit development of a strong buyer market for the housing now at least
theoretically available for open occupancy.
Adoption of an and-discrimination law is often a necessary pre-
liminary to any alteration in long-entrenched practices. Yet it should
never be viewed as an end in itself. Fair housing legislation provides
no more than the opportunity to change the pattern of segregation that
still disfigures most of the residential areas in the nation. The change
itself will come only when a strong drive develops within the minority
communities to treat the promise of-the laws as a reality.
115. NAT'L COMM. AGAINST DIscIMINATIoN IN HOUSING TRENDS IN HOUSING 1 (May-
June 1961).
116. The factors producing this result are discussed in CoMMISsION ON RAcE AND- HOUS-
ING REPORT, WHERE SHALL WE LivE? 10-13 (1958).
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